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LOSING ALL SENSE OF JUST
PROPORTION: THE PECULIAR LAW OF
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
MICHAEL HEYMAN†
INTRODUCTION
Complicity is the outlier of criminal law. Representing an
extraordinary use of state power, criminal law both condemns
and punishes those who violate its norms. To be a proper subject
for that exercise of power, someone must engage in blameworthy
conduct. Nonetheless, complicity law, replete with statements
that liability is derivative,1 imposes liability for another’s
criminal conduct. Accordingly, complicity law seems to violate
the fundamental precept of personal wrongdoing as a predicate
for punishment. And, though it need not, in practice it has with
terrible frequency.
Worse perhaps, complicity law might undermine the very
principle of legality that underpins the legal system.2 Following
†

Professor, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago).
Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985). However, Professor
Kadish is not responsible for this sometimes-doggerel assertion. He warns “not to
misconstrue derivative liability as imparting vicarious liability,” indicating the
necessity for finding “intentional action” by the accomplice that makes it appropriate
to blame her. Id.
2
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, ILL. CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE &
REFORM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND
REFORM COMMISSION xxiii–xxiv (2003) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/illinois/IL%20final%20report%20Vol1.pdf
The report stated:
One of the critical functions of a criminal code is to provide notice to
citizens of what conduct is prohibited. Indeed, the fundamental principle
of legality — the requirement of a clear prior written prohibition as a
prerequisite to criminal liability — underlies numerous constitutional
and other core criminal-law rules, such as the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws and the constitutional invalidation of vague
offenses. Providing notice also has obvious practical value, for citizens
can hardly be expected to obey the law’s commands if they are unaware
of them, or cannot understand them.
1
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the Model Penal Code (the “Code”),3 many modern codes provide
for accomplice liability for anyone who “aids or agrees or
attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing” an
offense.4 Such open-ended liability based on no clearly defined
wrongful conduct seems to flout the notion that criminal laws
must be precisely expressed to be valid and seems at odds with
the otherwise staggering achievement of the Code regarding
culpability.
Confronting a hodge-podge of criminal laws from this
country, the Code created a common lexicon and means for
drafting criminal laws. Rather than dealing with the oddities of
malice, evil, or similar vague and arcane notions, the Code
reduced the number of possible mental states to four and reduced
the requirements to satisfy the commission of an act to three.5
The Code paved the way not only for the drafting of more modern
codes, but also for reconceptualizing criminal law to better serve
its objectives.
But the Code’s provision on accountability may be as vague
and unworkable as then-existing law. Rather than providing
careful guidelines for what acts would suffice, it instead used
broad terms such as “aids” and “attempts to aid.”6 Furthermore,
it seemingly compounded problems by using that language to
modify “in planning or committing” the offense.7 Thus, by
rejecting the “baroque maze” of notions that pervaded the
common law of complicity, the Code provided a streamlining that
might have carried its own problems.8
Perhaps this was inevitable. Having committed to a unitary
law of complicity, the drafters of the Code faced a dilemma of
seemingly violating the careful work they had contributed to
establishing reformed culpability law. However, because the
3
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART I §§ 1.01 to 2.13
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) [hereinafter 1985 COMMENTARIES];
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART II §§ 210.0 to 213.6 (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1980) [hereinafter 1980 COMMENTARIES].
4
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
5
See id. § 2.02. Section 2.02 provides for purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence. Id. Similarly, the same section indicates that these mental states should
be carefully assigned to the conduct, results, or attendant circumstances confronting
the criminal actor. Id.
6
Id. § 2.06(3)(a)(ii).
7
Id.
8
Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case
Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388, 390–91 (2010).
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range of help available to accomplices is so great, and because
the difficulties of determining the causal efficacy of such aid is so
immense, the drafters had little choice but to create a law
founding liability on intentional aid demonstrating the
accomplice’s commitment to the criminal ends of the primary
actor.9
Unfortunately, these obvious difficulties of cabining
accomplice law were exacerbated by a parallel development in
the law. Most states still find the accomplice liable not only for
the assisted offense, but for those that are committed as a
“natural and probable consequence” of the commission of the
target offense.10 In fact, some have adopted this position despite
having codified the Code position on complicity.11 Thus, the
often-tenuous connection between the direct actor and his
accomplice is further attenuated, as he now shares responsibility
for conduct in which he has neither engaged nor intentionally
9
The Code had, after all, required that the accomplice provide that aid “with
the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.” MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
10
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 475 (6th ed. 2012)
[hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING]; see also Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549
U.S. 183, 190 (2007). In that case, the parties presented a virtual fifty state survey
on complicity law, with the respondent arguing against the legitimacy of this
doctrine. Nevertheless, reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Breyer said, “few
jurisdictions (only 10 in Duenas–Alvarez’s own view) have expressly rejected the
‘natural and probable consequences’ doctrine. Moreover, many States and the
Federal Government apply some form or variation of that doctrine, or permit jury
inferences of intent in circumstances similar to those in which California has applied
the doctrine, as explained below.” Id. at 190–91 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Indeed, even the respondent admitted that many states apply the doctrine
in the face of conflicting statutes or decisional law. Brief for Respondent at 17,
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (No. 05-1629).
As LaFave has explained: “The established rule, as it is usually stated by courts and
commentators, is that accomplice liability extends to acts of the principal in the first
degree which were a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the criminal scheme the
accomplice encouraged or aided.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 725 (5th ed.
2010) (citation omitted). Indeed, LaFave pointed out that recent codifications also
adopt this position. Id. at 726.
11
See generally Heyman, supra note 8. As that piece discusses, Illinois has,
rather sadly, codified this notion under the rubric of “common design.” Thus, the
Code provision sits side-by-side with this wholly conflicting one. See 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/5-2(c) (West 2012) (“When 2 or more persons engage in a common
criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design
committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common
design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those
further acts.”). Sadly, this development is consistent with LaFave’s observations
about the durability of this doctrine. See LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 725–27.
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assisted. Whatever flimsy connection might ordinarily tie the
two together in criminality would seem to be gone; yet liability
still attaches, taking complicity liability beyond the breaking
point.
Mindful of the presence of this doctrine, the Code repudiated
it, expressly distancing itself from it. From its perspective, the
natural and probable consequence doctrine was both
“incongruous and unjust.”12
The thinking was simple:
Predicating liability on foreseeability seemingly establishes
negligence as the mental state for the accomplice, though more is
required to convict the primary actor. That inverts things
unacceptably.
Because of the ambiguous nature of the
accomplice’s conduct, the dangers of convicting an innocent
person are so great that, if anything, the law should require a
greater mental state for the accomplice as opposed to the primary
actor.13
Thus, however mindless this foreseeability doctrine, it has
substantial traction. Its injustice should not go unnoticed, but
repudiation on any large scale will take some doing. Advancing
that objective requires a reappraisal of complicity law generally
to see the harms wrought by this doctrine. This Article first
examines the development of complicity law, noting its common
law origins. The Model Penal Code has streamlined the law, but
this is not evident until we recognize the maze of terms and
concepts that preceded it. Thus, I point out the complex, but
flawed, categories of actors that existed at common law and the
significance of the accomplice’s location and temporal
relationship to the criminal event.
Second, I show the harm wrought by this natural and
probable consequence, or common design, doctrine. Magnifying
the problematic issues of general complicity law, it extends
accomplice liability to establish a form of guilt by association
totally at odds with civilized notions of criminal liability. Here,
an examination of the problems of one state, Illinois, exemplifies
this unfortunate turn in the law and represents the general
pathology of criminal law development. The thinking of the Code
has been entirely subverted in this terribly critical area.

12
13

1985 COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, § 2.06 at 312 n.42.
Id.

FINAL_HEYMAN

2013]

12/11/2013 3:33 PM

PECULIAR LAW OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY

133

I then examine the theoretical constructs of any notion of
complicity, as well as the predominant thinking of several critics.
Criticism is nearly pointless without an attempt to replace bad
doctrine with something preferable, and the chief thinkers in this
area have tried to do just that. Thus, some have sought to infuse
substantial notions of causal contribution into complicity law,14
while others find causal analysis better applied to the laws of
nature than to those governing human conduct.15 I find all such
approaches misguided; they treat complicity law as if it is a
quagmire from which we can emerge, by simply creating better
theory that properly assigns blame and captures the dynamic of
the accomplice-primary actor relationship. As explained the
variety and forms of accomplice assistance rule out the
imposition of any grand theory upon this area.
Instead, we have to examine the ends of criminal law and fit
accomplice liability within them. Accordingly, I bring complicity
law within a system based on individual culpability: a system
that condemns and punishes based on the actor’s personal
commitment to the criminal objective. The Code did this with its
inclusion of the term “attempts to aid” and its other provisions on
complicity, and we should recognize the limits of any attempt to
substantially improve upon that basic construct.
I.

COMPLICITY LAW: ORIGINS AND ACTORS

Complicity law can be a real “jaw-dropper” for the
uninitiated.16 In a recent article, Joshua Dressler recounted a
rather remarkable story from The New York Times17 concerning a
nineteen-year-old boy sentenced to ten years in prison as an
accomplice to a drug sale.18 However, rather than acting in any
traditional capacity, the teenager had acted as a translator for a

14
Joshua Dressler has done this on a few occasions. See Joshua Dressler,
Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 427, 447 (2008) (“A person is not accountable for the actions of the
perpetrator unless her assistance not only satisfies the causation requirement but
there is evidence that the accomplice was a substantial participant, not a bit player,
in the multi-party crime.”).
15
Kadish, supra note 1, at 360 (“Sine qua non in the physical causation sense,
therefore, does not exist in any account of human actions.”).
16
Lawyer Tells Youths of Drug Deal Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998 at 19.
17
See Dressler, supra note 14, at 429 n.5 (citing Lawyer Tells Youths of Drug
Deal Risks, supra note 16.
18
Lawyer Tells Youths of Drug Deal Risks, supra note 16.
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Spanish-speaking friend in the drug deal.19 Thus, a teenager,
who held a full-time job and had never had any previous brushes
with the law, received a ten-year sentence in a federal
penitentiary with no possibility of parole.20 Yet, for all we know,
that teenager was simply with a friend who made the purchase
and, when asked, translated a few words here and there.
This is no one-time horror tale. By placing the primary actor
on the same footing as the accomplice, complicity law treats them
equally for all purposes.21 Naturally, that is not in the least
confined to drug offenses. One well-known legal chestnut deals
with the unfortunate reporter who hailed the arrival of a
prominent jazz musician for his performance at the Princes
Theatre in London.22 Apparently the artist, Coleman Hawkins,
was prohibited from employment in the United Kingdom, a fact
presumably known to the reporter, Herbert Wilcox. Thus, the
court found his paid presence at the concert the basis for his
liability as an accomplice to Hawkins and nothing more was
required.23
Indeed, explaining the basis for his liability, the court said
that he was “present, taking part, concurring, or encouraging,
whichever word you like to use for expressing this conception.” 24
But which words are used does matter. It matters a great deal.
The court was unconcerned with whether Wilcox in any way
communicated with Hawkins. Moreover, it is not even clear
what was being approved of or encouraged: musical artistry or a
violation of the criminal laws of the United Kingdom. Similarly,
the court was equally indifferent to precisely when Hawkins’
offense took place, and thus, whether Wilcox could even have
caused it, at this point. What we have then is criminal liability
in one who undoubtedly did not cause the criminal conduct and
was simply one of many in an appreciative audience at that
concert.

19

Id.
Id.
21
The potential for sympathetic sentencing is frequently possible, but not in
that setting given the mandatory nature of the applicable drug sentences.
22
Wilcox v. Jeffery, (1951) 1 All E.R. 464 (K.B.) (U.K.).
23
Id.
24
Id.
20

FINAL_HEYMAN

2013]

12/11/2013 3:33 PM

PECULIAR LAW OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY

135

But as foolish as this result seems, it is equally foolish to
abolish complicity entirely as a legal notion.25 Though criminal
liability attaches to the actor who engages directly in the
prohibited act, others can play roles of varying degrees of
involvement, leading up to that conduct. And that is just the
problem: determining what counts as involvement sufficient to
implicate criminal liability for the accomplice, without losing all
sense of just proportion.26
A.

Common Law Approaches and Comparative Insights

Though crimes may frequently be the product of individual
action, some may require more participants. Some, by their
nature, require different people performing different tasks. The
classic cases come from conspiracy law, where engaging
metaphors have been used to depict the nature of the
conspiratorial relationship, its party dimension. For example,
the case of United States v. Bruno27 strained this metaphoric
rendering of conspiratorial relationships.
In Bruno, eighty-eight defendants were charged with a
single conspiracy “to import, sell and possess narcotics.”28 The
group consisted of smugglers, middlemen, and two groups of
retailers selling to addicts in New York, Texas, and Louisiana.29
Invoking the famous images of the chain and the wheel, the court
recognized the interdependence of the different types of groups
extending as a veritable criminal chain and the relationship of
the retailers at the end to the middlemen as spokes in a wheel in
which the middlemen served as hubs.30 However inapt those
25
See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 519 N.E.2d 1320 (Mass. 1988). That case
involved a rape that took place at a bar viewed by sixteen customers (many cheering
and laughing) and a bartender, none of whom helped the victim. Id. at 1321. That
event was poignantly depicted in the 1988 movie The Accused, starring Jodie Foster.
See THE ACCUSED (Paramount Pictures 1988).
26
Rejecting membership in a conspiracy as a per se basis for accomplice
liability, the Code commentary anchored liability in the conduct of the would-be
accomplice. Indeed, warning against a per se approach it said: “law would lose all
sense of just proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each were held
accountable for thousands of additional offenses of which he was completely
unaware and which he did not influence at all.” 1985 COMMENTARIES, supra note 3,
§ 2.06 at 307.
27
105 F.2d 921, 922–23 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
28
Id. at 922.
29
Id.
30
See id. at 922–23 (discussing the relationship of distribution between the
smugglers, middlemen, and retailers).

FINAL_HEYMAN

136

12/11/2013 3:33 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:129

depictions, they did manage to capture the complex relationships
necessary to achieve the ultimate objective of the extremely
profitable sale of narcotics on the streets.
Complicity differs from conspiracy, but conspiracy is
obviously an agreement to do something, and both involve multiparty criminal enterprises.31 Though the codefendants in Bruno
stood on equal criminal footing despite their disparate roles,
complicity law has shown real ambivalence about the very basis
for a party’s linkage to the completed offense. In both complicity
and conspiracy we have multiple parties and concerted actions,
and while complicity inherently requires more of the would-be
accomplice, the issue has often become of “what” do we “need”
more.
Dressler, in a central article, sought to find that missing
ingredient.32 There, he considered the relative strengths of the
various theories supporting accomplice liability and, indeed,
whether all parties should be punished equally. Focusing on the
“hegemony test,” he considered the liability of the brains behind
a bank robbery that, nevertheless, had little control over the
other participants.33 In his example, the brains might consist of
a skilled electrician who had the know-how to disable the alarm
system.34 Yet, under the hegemony test, the “brains” would be
exempt from full punishment, something that offends our moral
intuitions about blame and punishment.35
At least the act hegemony approach has the virtue of
predicating punishment on a person’s level of involvement in an
offense, contrasting dramatically with the somewhat simpleminded common law approaches. The common law constructed
accomplice liability upon the two axies of time and location, and
thus, based liability on the categories into which the actors fell.

31

Conspiracy is an inchoate offense usually requiring little conduct beyond the
agreement. By contrast, complicity obviously requires the commission on an offense.
32
Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 92–93 (1985).
33
Id. at 124.
34
Id.
35
To Dressler, this approach “goes too far in permitting leniency” as it “excludes
from full punishment too many actors, even as it generally ensures that those who
are fully punished deserve it.” Id.
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Under the common law, actors were categorized as principals
or accessories.36 The major actor was the “principal in the first
degree,” often and understandably thought of as the real
perpetrator.37 Simply put, he performed the crime in the most
conventional sense, satisfying both the act and mental state
requirements personally, or through another whom he
controlled.38 Absent other actors, we think of him as the criminal
actor.
But, as crimes are often the product of concerted action,
there was a need to deal with the others who played some roles
in committing crimes. The common law could have simply
rejected the idea of accomplice liability, but in embracing it, the
coomon law had to somehow define the types of roles played by
more indirect players. The next type of actor is the “principal in
the second degree.”39 Here, potentially separated from the crime
by both time and location, the actor in the second degree
nevertheless played some sort of role in assisting the chief actor.
Yet it is problematic to attenuate criminality through this party
as, by definition, she has not committed the actus reus of the
offense. That’s where the common law started to get bogged
down, as by extending liability beyond the perpetrator, it now
had to confront the question of just what others had to do to
deserve punishment.
Thus, though this party did not have to be present,40 he did
have to provide some form of assistance or encouragement,
whereby it seemed fitting to hold him liable. So, for example,
though we think of Dressler’s expert electrician as a principal in
the second degree for the early, though significant, role he played
in the heist, as we will see, he would not count. Rather,

36
For a fuller development of this scheme, see DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING,
supra note 10, at 460–61.
37
Id. at 460.
38
See id. at 460–61. The Code wound up dealing with this issue of manipulation
through its notion of the innocent instrumentality. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.06(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). It provided that one is responsible for the
acts of another if she has the “culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense, [and] [s]he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such
conduct.” Id.
39
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 10, at 462.
40
The perpetrator was deemed to be constructively present. And as Dressler
points out, a person is constructively present if “he is situated in a position to assist
the principal in the first degree during the commission of the crime.” Id.
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paradigms for complicity consisted of those who served as
lookouts, getaway drivers and others who played functional roles
in the criminal venture.
That skilled electrician would, instead, be characterized as
an “accessory before the fact.” As the law developed, that party
was neither actually nor constructively present, but rather
played some role in the pre-crime setting. Additionally, because
of that separation from the crime, she was frequently considered
less blameworthy than the other parties.
Finally, the “accessory after the fact” played an odd role in
this scheme. Often, the accessory existed solely to obscure the
commission of the offense or shield the other actors from
detection. Despite that, however, for some time he was regarded
as derivatively liable for the crimes already committed.
Fortunately, this has changed, as now virtually all jurisdictions
regard his conduct as separate and apart from the original
offense, thus constituting a new crime.41
But over time the drawbacks of this scheme became clear, as
liability hinged on the when and where of what one did, rather
than on either the causal efficacy of her conduct or her degree of
involvement in the criminal venture. However, this is not the
only approach taken by criminal codes.
1.

The German Approach to Complicity

German law represents an instructive departure from this
approach.
It shares the common law inclination to base
complicity on one’s distinctive role, but substantially redefines
each role. Whereas the common law regarded time and place as
critical, the German approach is based on one’s functional role in
the crime’s commission. By its approach, there are five types of
criminal actors:

41

Id. at 463.
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First, there is the direct perpetrator (unmittelbarer Täter).42
This is obvious, and tracks the thinking of the MPC.43 Here,
there is obviously no issue of imputing conduct to another, for the
direct perpetrator has directly engaged in the criminal act.
Next, the German scheme has recognized the indirect
perpetrator (mittelbarer Täter), a party described by one
commentator as one who “uses another as an unwitting or
unwilling tool to engage in the proscribed conduct.”44 This, too,
finds an analogue in the Code, in that it also recognizes the need
to codify this approach, lest someone escape liability behind this
subterfuge.45
Finally, still dealing with the criminal conduct of the offense
itself, German law recognizes a co-perpetrator (Mittätter),46 one
who jointly engages in the prohibited conduct with the direct
perpetrator. However, it is here that German law may be
puzzling, since it regards some forms of accomplice contribution
as being of equal blameworthiness with that of the acts of the
direct perpetrator and thus conflates their roles. Thus, so long as
the co-perpetrator agrees upon a common plan with the direct
actor and acts upon that, he is equally blameworthy.47
Here the German approach parted ways with the common
law. Though the common law distinguished between actors
based on a temporal scheme, the Germans gave no weight to
that. Here, this approach more closely represents that of the

42
Markus D. Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, 5 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 977, 979 (2007).
43
Recall that section 2.06 begins by stating “[a] person is guilty of an offense if
it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he
is legally accountable, or both.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
44
Dubber, supra note 42. (illuminating contrast of the common law and German
schemes).
45
Again, the Code assigns liability so long as “acting with the kind of culpability
that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or
irresponsible person to engage in such conduct.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
46
Dubber, supra note 42.
47
See Kai Hamdorf, The Concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise and Domestic
Modes of Liability for Parties to a Crime: A Comparison of German and English Law,
5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 208, 212 (2007).
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Code, basing accomplice liability on the “aid” lent to the criminal
venture.48 Nonetheless, the German approach is both puzzling
and unique hereafter.
Having recognized three categories of perpetrators, it then
has two distinct and different categories, roughly corresponding
to accessories. First is the solicitor (Anstifter).49 That is someone
who incites or encourages another to engage in the criminal
conduct. Though we might expect him to be punished more
lightly than the principals, that is not so.50 However, mitigated
punishment is provided for the fifth and last category of actor
under German law.
The facilitator (Gehilfe) is someone who only aids another in
committing the act, though he is not treated as a perpetrator.51
Indeed, he receives a mandatory punishment discount under
German law, presumably because his assistance reflects a lesser
involvement in the criminal enterprise.52 This clearly parts ways
with the Model Penal Code and signals a critical theme in
German accomplice law: the significance of Tatherrschaft,
something roughly translated as act dominion.53 Thus, the
borderline distinction between co-perpetrator and facilitator
under German law would be resolved by determining whether
one had Tatherrschaft, a distinction particularly bewildering as it
is unhinged to presence. One can be present and not have it, yet
absent and still have Tatherrschaft.54
And, as explained,
substantial punishment mitigation may hinge on this factor.
On its face, the German categorical approach seems
preferable to its common law counterparts, as it distinguishes the
participants on a more precise, functional basis, and levies
punishments differently between the principals and the
48
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). There, you are
an accomplice if, “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense” one “aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or
committing it.” Id. § 2.06(3)(a).
49
STRAFGESETZBUCH
[STGB]
[PENAL
CODE],
Nov.
13,
1998,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] § 26 (Ger.), available at http://dejure.org/
gesetze/StGB/26.html.
50
See id. § 25.
51
Id. § 27.
52
Section 49 of the code specifies special mitigating circumstances. For example,
were the principal actor to receive imprisonment for life, the facilitator would receive
not fewer than three years. See id. § 49(1).
53
Dubber, supra note 42, at 981.
54
See id. at 982.
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facilitator.
And, perhaps it is preferable.
However, the
semblance of tidiness proved somewhat illusory, as the scholars
and courts in Germany have wrestled with a different approach
to complicity.55 This formal, objective theory was in tension with
a more subjective approach, one based on this notion of
Tatherrschaft. Clearly analogous to what Dressler called act
hegemony, this notion brings us back to the idea that the
categorical approach does not always align perfectly with our
intuitions of blameworthiness and proper punishment.
Under this evolving theory, parties should be classified
according to their control over the actus reus of the crime. But
the ambiguity of that view has been recognized, and German
courts have further refined this notion, recognizing three
distinctive kinds of control: First, the actor may control the
action itself (Handlungsherrschaft).56 Second, he may exercise
control
over
the
volitional
controls
of
another
57
(Willensherrschaft).
Finally, he may exercise control over the
functional aspects of the crime (funktionale Tatherrschaft).58
Now the complexities and tensions with the German law are
beyond the scope of this paper. However, German law recognizes
the need to both categorize actors, yet also show some flexibility
of approach to serve the overarching objective of adjusting the
criminal law to ferret out the worst actors and apportion blame
accordingly. Indeed, comparing the two systems, Professor
Dubber concluded not only that the similarities vastly outweigh
the differences, but also that they shared the common
commitment to reject any notion of guilt by association.59 As
Dubber said, “Most important, both systems are committed to
complying with the general principle that criminal liability
requires that each defendant — perpetrator and accomplice alike
— satisfy each element of the offence as statutorily defined.”60
However, this statement is only partially true.

55

See Hamdorf, supra note 47, at 210.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. See generally CARL ERIK HERLITZ, PARTIES TO A CRIME AND THE NOTION
OF A COMPLICITY OBJECT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ALTERNATIVES PROVIDED
BY THE MODEL PENAL CODE, SWEDISH LAW AND CLAUS ROXIN 279–81 (1992)
(discussing funktionale Tatherrschaft as cases of co-perpetration).
59
Dubber, supra note 42, at 978.
60
Id.
56
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The natural and probable consequences doctrine61 dispenses
with all need to prove any mental state for the accomplice. If the
second offense is regarded as a natural consequence of the first,
an accomplice to the first offense is automatically liable for the
second. Remarkably, this doctrine has withstood the adoption of
the Code in some states,62 as it has been nurtured as a judicially
created notion to which the judiciary has clung stubbornly. An
examination of this doctrine reveals its dangers and serious
subversion of sensible doctrine.
II. NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
The story of the translator’s liability and ten-year sentence is
disconcerting. But is it so inevitably wrong? We do not know,
and that is precisely the point. We do not know what the boy did,
nor can we conclude anything from the mere fact of their
friendship. For example, it may be that the translator was
walking with his friend, by chance they happened upon the
dealer, he translated a few words when asked, and that was it.
Absent any predefined relationship involving the sale or
purchase of drugs, the translator’s involvement may have been
utterly minimal, spontaneous, and fleeting.
That is not the only possibility. It might also be that the boy
regularly served as a translator, frequently playing a key role in
facilitating the sale and purchase of drugs. Were that the case,
the poignant appeal of the story would disappear. And it would
disappear because he was directly involved in the proscribed
conduct, though only acting in a secondary capacity. Moreover,
his choice to participate would then be clear, and his liability
would be based upon his own conduct. But by either scenario, he
was involved in the drug transaction.
But now imagine a changed situation, one in which he
accompanied some friends to a house where drugs were
purchased. Imagine further that he knew a sale was in the offing
as he waited outside, but that things went terribly wrong inside
during the transaction, and his friends were charged with
attempted murder of the other boys, having fired some shots at
61

Or, as I have said and it is sometimes known, the “Common Design doctrine.”
However, as I have said, apparently ten states have rejected this doctrine
explicitly. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 10, at 475 n.95. At the same
time, states such as Illinois maintain that doctrine along with the obviously
conflicting Code version of complicity.
62
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them. Finally, imagine that the shots were fired with guns
wrested by them from the others, as they were initially unarmed
at the time of the encounter. In that setting, a conviction could
easily be obtained against him for the attempted murders—as
well as the others, naturally—using the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. But why?
Crime is a compound concept, requiring the actor to engage
in the proscribed conduct with the requisite mental state.63
Many modern codes reflect this and, frequently following the
Model Penal Code, specify this clearly.64 Indeed, demonstrating
repugnance at the idea of strict liability, the Code specifically
requires proof of culpability absent a clear demonstration that
strict liability was intended.65 Finally, these very requirements
are repeated in both the Code and state codes, in their sections
on complicity. By dispensing with the requirements of personal
wrongdoing, this natural and probable doctrine undercuts this
clear requirement of personal liability. The doctrine has arisen
out of an odd interplay between legislatures and courts, one in
which courts have shown a common law bias at odds with
modern code law.
This bias would ensnare our young translator, as courts have
frequently ignored the niceties of code law, in favor of intuitive
perceptions of justice.66 By that view, having thrown in with his
63

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
For example, the Illinois Code rearranges the MPC sections, but provides that
“[a] person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct
is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable
for such conduct as provided in Section 5-2, or both.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/51 (West 2012). That code then literally compounds things, by providing that a
voluntary act is a “material element of every offense” and no one is guilty of an
offense, other than one involving strict liability, unless she possesses the mental
state prescribed for the offense. Id. at 5/4–1, 5/4–3.
65
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Moreover,
section 2.02(3) requires proof of purpose, knowledge or recklessness if the relevant
law does not prescribe the culpability involved. Id. § 2.02(3). Again, state codes, such
as that of Illinois, clearly oppose any presumption of strict liability and impose the
same proof in the face of legislative silence. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b),
5/4-9.
66
See James R. Thompson et al., The Illinois Criminal Code of 2009: Providing
Clarity in the Law, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 815, 818 (2008) (explaining how the
achievements of the CLEAR Commission and the Code changed resulting from the
authors’ efforts). Commenting on the newly-codified Common Design rule, the
authors characterized the rule as having been consistently applied by the Illinois
Supreme Court “for over one hundred and fifty years.” Id. at 823. And although they
lauded the rule as being consistent with the existing statute, that position is
64
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friends, the boy bore responsibility for their illegal conduct that
grew out of the drug deal. But though that cannot be supported
by any cognizable criminal law theory, the origins and tenor of
complicity law reveal a real doctrinal ambivalence. Part of the
body of criminal law deals with multiple parties and their
acquiescence in the conduct of others. Thus, it resists neat
classification, partially about representational relationships, it
draws simultaneously from criminal law as well as doctrines
from agency law.
Commentators as varied as Francis Sayre and George
Fletcher have noticed this ambivalence.67 Writing well before the
modern code era, Sayre discussed complicity within the context of
the agency rule of respondeat superior.68 The similarities are
obvious, as in both settings someone has acquiesced in being
represented by another. Indeed, as Sayre notes, “even if the
particular criminal act has not been authorized or consented to, if
it grows out of and is the proximate consequence of one that has
been authorized or procured,” the defendant is justly liable.69
But Sayre drew the line at what he called “true crimes,” as “it is
of the very essence of our deep-rooted notions of criminal liability
that guilt be personal and individual.”70
Similarly, Fletcher, bemoaning this theoretical incoherence,
called for reconceptualizing this criminal relationship to capture
the person most deserving of serious punishment.71
Unquestionably, however extralegal it is, courts frequently lump
together the accomplice to the original offense with the principal

untenable. See Heyman, supra note 8, at 390–91 (explaining how the “principal in
the second degree” can be one who was not physically present or who provided
assistance).
67
See Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43
HARV. L. REV. 689, 689–90 (1930) (discussing how different systems of law have
reached varying solutions for the relationship of master or principal and servant or
agent); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 664 (Oxford U. Press
2000) (1978) (describing the ambivalence as a result of deciding “whether criminal
law is similar to or different from the private law of agency”).
68
This is the familiar notion whereby the master is liable for even the wrongful
conduct of his servants. See Sayre, supra note 67, at 690.
69
Id. at 703–04.
70
Id. at 717.
71
FLETCHER, supra note 67, at 660. It should also be observed that Fletcher
preferred the sophistication of the German system, especially the parts calling for
differentiated punishments. See id. at 659.
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actor under this natural and probable view, despite dramatic—
and, you would think, obvious—differences in culpability. And,
in many cases, they do so claiming statutory support.
A.

The Odd Law of Common Design

Pity poor Rudy Kessler. A man in the wrong place at the
wrong time found himself charged with two counts of attempted
murder for sitting in a car and waiting for his friends to return.72
Kessler and two friends had spent some time carousing, when
one mentioned that he needed to “ ‘put his hands on’ $1800.”73
Kessler mentioned that he had worked at a bar in Rockford,
Illinois not long ago, but that the receipts have rarely been that
large.74 Nonetheless, the other two decided to head off toward
the bar, to see what they could find.
Entering after closing, they found more than they bargained
for. Though unarmed, they got into a scuffle with the bar owner
who had returned to inspect the premises, found a pistol behind
the bar, and shot him in the neck.75 Fleeing the scene, they also
fired several shots at pursuing state police.76 Eventually run off
the road, they were arrested and ultimately charged with one
count of burglary and two counts of attempted murder.77 Thus
far, Kessler’s conduct is strongly reminiscent of our translator’s.
Hanging around with the wrong guys, he found himself in
trouble almost entirely of their making. Yet, because of their
close association, he faced identical criminal liability though the
applicable code seemed to preclude this result.
Convicted on two counts of attempted murder, Kessler
argued that the Code barred such a result. Specifically, he
argued that intent to kill was wholly lacking, without which
there could be no attempted murder. Though he was successful

72

People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 30 (Ill. 1974).
Id.
74
Id. For the appellate opinion detailing those facts, see People v. Kessler, 296
N.E.2d 631, 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
75
Kessler, 315 N.E.2d at 31.
76
Id.
77
Id.
73
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at the appellate level, the state Supreme Court disagreed.78 In
that court, the common law bias easily overcame the clear
mandate of the statute.
Largely ignoring Kessler’s argument, the court focused on
the meaning of the word “conduct” within the state accountability
statutes.79 The language is critically important, it provided that:
“[a] person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an
offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of
another and he is legally accountable for such conduct.”80
Thereafter, it set out the predicates for accomplice liability,
namely intentional aid in the commission of the target offense.81
As the Illinois scheme closely followed the Model Penal Code,
it also provided definitions of critical terms such as “voluntary
act” and “conduct.” At the time, Illinois defined “conduct” as “a
series of acts, and the accompanying mental state.”82 Again,
sweeping aside the mental state requirement, the court agreed
with the state’s argument that conduct included all of the acts of
the wrongdoer:
We believe the statute, as it reads, means that where one aids
another in the planning or commission of an offense, he is
legally accountable for the conduct of the person he aids; and
that the word ‘conduct’ encompasses any criminal act done in
furtherance of the planned and intended act.83

The court applied a bludgeon to this carefully crafted statutory
scheme, forcing a doctrine upon it that plainly did not fit.

78
The appellate court rather reluctantly agreed with Kessler, concluding that
“[i]mputed or implied intent [was] clearly outside the contemplation of the statute on
accountability,” though the common design rule was a “more reasonable approach to
the law of accountability but one which [the court could not] adopt in contravention
of the language in the Code.” Kessler, 296 N.E.2d at 636, 636 n.3.
79
Note that both the Illinois Code and the Model Penal Code premise guilt on
one’s intentional connection to the conduct of another for whom he is legally
accountable. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1 (West 2012). However, I say the court ignored his
argument because it focused solely on the act component of the statute, ignoring the
mens rea issue entirely.
80
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1 (emphasis added).
81
Id. at 5/5–2.
82
Kessler, 315 N.E.2d at 32 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 2-4 (1971))
(current version at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-4).
83
Id. (emphasis added).
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The term “conduct” in the accountability section was plainly
linked to “an element of” the target offense.84 Through that
mechanism, someone who has not directly committed the
criminal act is liable nevertheless, provided that he afforded
intentional assistance in its commission. That scheme does not
accommodate common design—or its generic sibling, natural and
probable)—as guilt requires this linkage to each crime, one by
one. Thus, had Kessler been present at the time of the shootings
and, for example, provided a weapon upon demand, he could have
been guilty. However, passively sitting unaware of these events
in the car outside of the bar, he could not remotely be found
guilty. Yet of course, he was.85 Worse, he was sentenced to five
to fifteen years on each count of attempted murder.86
Because of the crudity of this court’s reasoning, it did
nothing to delineate any contours for accomplice liability.
Without even examining what is meant by “common design,” it
nevertheless found that they had one, and that was the sole basis
for Kessler’s guilt.87 Thus, we are back to our translator who is
unlucky enough to be linked to those who expand the criminal
venture, and we are without any guidance for assessing his
individual guilt. But that was 1974, barely a decade into the new
Code law. Yet, unfortunately, matters have only worsened.
B.

Parallel Courses, Opposite Directions

The discussion here about German developments and
scholarly discussion in American journals would seem to bode
well for law’s progress in America. It may be just the opposite:
As German jurisprudence refines this notion of act dominion and
as American scholars wrestle with fundamental questions about
complicity law, courts and legislatures often proceed unfazed
by—and unaware of—these inquiries.88 Were act dominion the

84

Id. at 31.
Perhaps even more telling of this notion of guilt by association was that the
court went on to attempt to buttress its finding by citing to both Nineteenth Century
case law—clearly inapplicable to the Code)—and felony murder jurisprudence; the
latter authority is particularly inappropriate, as felony murder provides its own
principle of liability as a strict liability doctrine. Id. at 32.
86
See People v. Kessler, 296 N.E.2d 631, 633 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973).
87
See Kessler, 315 N.E.2d at 31–32.
88
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code
Second Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 (2003). There,
Robinson and Cahill bemoan the amendment cycles experienced by post 1960s and
85
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touchstone for accomplice liability, liability would turn on a
potentially long, highly detailed factual inquiry into a party’s
conduct. As it is, courts have done just the opposite, reciting
empty platitudes that have only lead to this judicially created
mess.
Following the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Kessler,89
that Court’s view was embodied in the pattern jury instructions
used by various trial judges.90 Such instructions provide the
blueprint for the instructions given to juries and are often given
verbatim. Here are the instructions on accountability:
A person is legally responsible for the conduct of another
person when, either before or during the commission of an
offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of [an] offense, he knowingly solicits, aids, abets,
agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in the
planning or commission of [an] offense.
[The word “conduct” includes any criminal act done in
furtherance of the planned and intended act.] 91

Finally, the Pattern Jury Instructions provide that “[i]ntent
to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense may be
shown by evidence that the defendant shared a criminal intent of
the principal or evidence that there was a common criminal
design.”92 Performing a sleight-of-hand, whereby association
with the principal becomes the basis for accomplice liability,
courts have charted a course for disaster.
Common design has been used as an expedient to avoid
having to prove an accomplice’s guilt for subsequent offenses; it
But its core precept, open-ended
operates automatically.93
liability for the misconduct of one’s cohorts, can lead to its
1970s Codes. Regarding those amendments as almost inevitably leading to code
degradations, they examine a major engine driving those developments: the “newsstory/political-response cycle.” Id. at 170. The Illinois amendments discussed here
provide a particularly painful example of code degradation. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/5-2 (West 2012).
89
Kessler, 315 N.E.2d at 30.
90
See, e.g., ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 5.03 (4th ed. 2011).
91
Id. I have chosen the word “an” as provided for in these instructions in the
case of a multi-crime setting.
92
Id. (emphasis added). Note also that this instruction dispenses with the need
to prove the mental state of the accused. Moreover, since the so-called “common
design” participant is responsible for the conduct of others, the instructions also
eliminate the need to prove his wrongful acts. See Heyman, supra note 8, at 409.
93
Naturally, since “common design” is just a local name for natural and
probable, anything said of the one is true for the other.
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expansion even beyond these malign uses. For example, imagine
two street gangs involved in a violent conflict where someone was
shot, but not killed. Imagine further that it can only be proven
that the shots came from one of several boys even though formal
ballistic tests were performed. It would seem, then, that charges
against any person would fail, as it cannot be determined who
shot the victim. Naturally, this is not the case.
People v. Cooper94 illustrated such a situation. That case
examined the unsightly spectacle of the clash between two street
gangs, the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples, which
resulted in the killing of one gang member and the serious
wounding of another on the streets of Chicago.95 On appeal to
the state supreme court, defendants claimed that the failure to
identify which one shot the victim prevents either from being
designated the principal, thus ruling out any potential
accountability.96 The court disagreed.97
First, the court cited the too-familiar shibboleth of common
design, indicating the joint responsibility parties bear for the acts
of all.98 It then proceeded to enlarge that rule to affirm the
conviction in this case. The language used is critical: “Evidence
that a defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on
illegal acts with knowledge of its design supports an inference
that he shared the common purpose and will sustain his
conviction for an offense committed by another.”99 The breadth of
this language is staggering, as is its sentiment. This would seem
to make mere membership in a gang a sufficient basis for guilt
for anything done by any member. Taken seriously, this is a
total and impermissible rewrite of the accountability statute.
However, since liability hinges on sharing of a common
purpose, the court then explained what counts as sharing: “A
conviction under accountability does not require proof of a
preconceived plan if the evidence indicates involvement by the
accused in the spontaneous acts of the group.”100 This is scarcely
the language of criminal law at all. The predicate conduct by the
defendant is “involvement,” and the very notion of the need for a
94

743 N.E.2d 32 (Ill. 2000).
Id. at 36.
96
Id. at 41.
97
Id. at 42.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
95
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“common plan” is undercut by the denial of any need for a plan at
all, whereby association with “spontaneous” conduct cements the
defendant’s relationship to both the group and its objectives.
Despite the odd references here to communities of unlawful
purpose, guilt was not based on any community of effort.101 On
the contrary, guilt was based on the defendant’s presence, that
he fired shots and that someone from this group, known or
unknown to him, with or without his help, shot the victim.
All traditional doctrine has been jettisoned in favor of a
position that can only yield guilt. Indeed, the court virtually
concedes this in its parting comments on this issue, citing to the
view that “accountability may be established through a person’s
knowledge of and participation in the criminal scheme, even
though there is no evidence that he directly participated in the
criminal act itself.”102 As true as that may be in some contexts,103
to cite that concept here only indicates that the defendant’s
connection to the shooting has not been established, but that
simply does not matter.
Indeed, the court’s discussion is also noteworthy for what is
never said. The Illinois accountability statute is taken virtually
verbatim from the Code, which requires that someone
intentionally assist another in the commission of a crime. Yet,
despite the obvious culpability requirement for accomplice
liability, the court said absolutely nothing about defendant’s
mental state.
In the plainest sense, accountability is established when
someone has helped another to commit a crime. But there was
absolutely no discussion of how Cooper helped the others
whereby we could conclude that he should be liable for their
conduct. Instead, speaking in the broadest—and vaguest—
language, the court found guilt based on presence and
misconduct in this admittedly loathsome display of gang
behavior.104 And yet, the crime of which Cooper was convicted
was not “gang behavior.”

101
Id. at 43 (“[S]uch evidence sufficiently demonstrated a common design and a
community of unlawful purpose between the defendant and the unknown
assailant.”).
102
Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908, 924 (Ill. 1995)).
103
As with someone who participated in the planning of a crime, or played a
major role in an early stage of a criminal enterprise.
104
See Cooper, 743 N.E.2d at 43–44.
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Cooper was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm.105
That was the sole crime committed by anyone who was party to
this encounter. But it was not clear at all whether an aggravated
battery was even committed. Whereas common design had been
used to link a defendant guilty of one offense to a subsequent
one, its usage here stretched this doctrine beyond its initial
contours. In the absence of any first crime, mere presence at this
dreadful spectacle sufficed for allegiance to some form of groupheld common design. Though Kessler was at least proved guilty
of the burglary, here no criminal conduct at all was proven;
presence alone sufficed.
It is hard to deny the pro-prosecution flavor of this doctrine
and the zeal with which courts have favored it. The traditional
arguments made by the defense, rooted in doctrine, have been
swept aside in favor of an impermissibly broad definition of
conduct, and in particular, one favoring presence at a criminal
event. Why is that? How has criminal law evolved to the point
at which clear statutory mandates have been ignored and
effectively replaced by conflicting ones that repudiate them?
C.

The Politics of Criminal Law Reform

Scholarly discussion often seems to proceed from the
unspoken premise that bad law will be recognized as such and
will somehow virtually self-correct. Naturally, no such thing
happens. In fact, criminal law is far less amenable to that myth
of spontaneous change than other areas of law because of some
serious built-in problems. As the late Bill Stuntz has observed,
several forces make substantive change difficult here.
First, whereas natural lobbies exist to oversee and propose
changes in some areas of law, “for most of criminal law, no
private intermediaries are well positioned to monitor the law’s
content and mobilize interested voters on one or another side of
contested issues.”106 The Model Penal Code was a spectacular
achievement but was driven by the backing of the American Law

105
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4.2 (West 1993) (repealed 2011),
available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=095-0236
(“A person commits aggravated battery with a firearm when he, in committing a
battery, knowingly or intentionally by means of the discharging of a firearm
(1) causes any injury to another person . . . .”).
106
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 529 (2001).
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Institute and the high profile and prestige of its members.
Criminal law currently commands no such support. To the
extent that states have enacted changes over the years since
widespread Code enactments, these changes have cluttered
codes, distorted meanings with inconsistent usage and generally
attached themselves to each once-new code like “barnacles
collecting on the hull of a ship.”107 Simply put, interest in
criminal law reform commands little attention outside of a small
circle of passionate parties who often appear to be talking only to
one another.108
Beyond that, powerful political forces drive changes, many of
which are unwelcome, to the substantive law. Criminal law is an
obvious hot-button area, and stories of atrocities and seeminglytoo-lax standards litter the news on a daily basis. On the
superficial level, conventional politics drive changes, often
following the ebb and flow of crime rates, especially violent
crime.109 But, as Stuntz observed, a deeper politics, one endemic
to this area, drives changes much more powerfully and
predictably.
These deeper politics consist of what Stuntz called the
politics of “institutional design and incentives.”110 In a complex
argument, he showed the dominance of prosecutors in criminal
law development, and the natural tendency of that development
to push toward broader rules of liability and harsher sentences.111
If Stuntz is right, and I think he is, it is easy to account for the
appeal of common design: It provides the optimal mechanism
whereby people are convicted at lowest institutional costs and
with greatest ease. However, this perverse doctrine has drawn
attention even outside of this small circle of cognoscenti, and has
received the attention of not one, but two, law reform
commissions.

107

See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 88, at 172.
As Stuntz has said, “[c]riminal law scholars may be talking to each other
(and to a few judges), but they do not appear to be talking to anyone else.” Stuntz,
supra note 106, at 508 (citation omitted).
109
Id. at 510.
110
Id.
111
Id. Though Stuntz saw the waning of the “tough-on-crime” sentiment, he also
saw no letup in the deeper politics, which pushed to make “criminal law both larger
and less relevant.” Id.
108
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D. The Progress of Criminal Law Reform
Law and order advocates frequently proclaim their
allegiance to the rule of law. Presumably, that provides the
normative content for the positions they espouse. However,
taking inventory of their requirements for guilt often produces a
healthy skepticism about their sincerity.
As state before, crime is a compound concept, requiring proof
of proscribed conduct with the requisite mental state.112
Complicity law, by its very nature, provides a mechanism
whereby guilt attaches to those less involved in the crime than
the principal actor. Because of these principles, and because of
the frequently murky involvement of the accomplice, we would
naturally expect the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to be
honored here, as the potential for wrongful conviction is often so
great. It would seem odd to protect the principal—someone
arguably more blameworthy—with the full panoply of rights,
while neglecting to protect the accomplice similarly. “Natural
and probable” turns “logic and expectations” on its head.
First, as implemented, the doctrine dispenses with the
requirement for a criminal act related to the target offense, as
involvement in the prior venture suffices. Indeed, though
complicity statutes explicitly require proof of criminal conduct,
cases like Kessler shunt that proof aside as an annoying
inconvenience.113 Moreover, decades later, in cases such as
Cooper, the requirement for involvement in a prior crime was
dropped, wherein the defendant’s “voluntary attachment” to a
gang provided the predicate for liability for any gang-related
crimes.114 Thus, this doctrine abrogates the bedrock doctrine
requiring a personal actus reus for guilt.
But it gets worse. Proof of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt”
requires the prosecution to prove both the conduct and the
requisite mental state. This is not mere hornbook doctrine, but it
is doctrine embodied in both the Model Penal Code and codes
such as Illinois’ that have adopted that. Thus, the Illinois code
rejects the notion of strict liability, requiring proof of mental
states unless the offense “clearly indicates a legislative purpose
112

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Recall that the Kessler court interpreted conduct to consist of all acts of the
principal actor, thus providing for the open-ended liability of the accomplice. See
People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. 1974).
114
See People v. Cooper, 743 N.E. 2d 32, 42–43 (Ill. 2000).
113
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to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.”115 Beyond
that, so critical is mens rea to guilt, that the statute elsewhere
requires that “[a] person is not guilty of an offense, other than an
offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to
each element [of] . . . the offense, he acts while having one of the
mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7.”116
This is significant for several reasons. First, it clearly rejects
the idea of strict liability except in unusual cases. Second, it
even rejects the notion that negligence can support guilt where
the statute is silent, as the sections referred to define intent,
knowledge, and recklessness, but not negligence. Thus, in
Kessler, for example, whereas the state had to prove that his
cohorts intended to kill the bartender and police officer, Kessler
was convicted utterly without proof of mental state at all. The
rule of law has not simply been ignored; it has been eviscerated.
Again, Professor Stuntz warned: “[t]he system by which we
make criminal law has produced not the rule of law but its
opposite. And the doctrines that aim to reinforce the rule of law
only add to the lawlessness.”117 But criminal law creation does
not take place wholly unchecked. For example, the state of
Illinois adopted major provisions of the Code a year before its
official promulgation. Moreover, not only did it benefit from the
decade-long work of that group, but the state also assigned the
task of code creation to its own distinguished group.118
Yet time passed, and roughly forty years after the Code’s
adoption, it had become so swollen with amendments and other
“barnacles” that then Governor George H. Ryan appointed a
commission to study the code and recommend all necessary
changes.119 Governor Ryan was aware of this degradation of the
115

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-9 (West 2012).
Id. at 5/4-3.
117
Stuntz, supra note 106, at 599. Sadly, so convinced was Professor Stuntz of
the intractability of this problem, he proposed the use of the rule of lenity, the
vagueness doctrine, and the ban on retroactive crime definition as the only viable
safeguards against this encroaching lawlessness. See id.
118
At the urging of the state Supreme Court and the Governor, the Chicago and
Illinois State bar associations established a joint committee in 1954 to work on
revising the criminal code. The joint committee completed its work in 1960, and it
was approved by the state legislature in 1961, taking effect the following January.
JOHN F. DECKER & CHRISTOPHER KOPACZ, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF
CRIMES AND DEFENSES Ch. 1, § 1.01 (5th ed. 2012).
119
In length alone, the code had increased from the seventy-two pages originally
enacted to over 1,200 at that time. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at v. Thus, Governor
116
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code—as well as unfortunate parallel developments in common
law—commenting specifically on the fact that “penalties are
disproportionate to the harm involved or in comparison to other
offenses, major criminal offenses are defined outside the
Criminal Code, and many important common-law rules remain in
force but uncodified.”120
Two years after the commission’s creation, it produced a
report spanning over 600 pages.121 That report, particularly
sensitive to culpability requirements and obviously troubled by
common design’s rejection of mens rea, explicitly recommended
the “[e]limination of the ‘[c]ommon [d]esign’ [r]ule for [c]omplicity
[l]iability.”122 But that was only the consensus opinion of the
commission members. A clear rift existed within the commission,
and Robinson provided commentary to explain the recommended
position:
Issue: Should the Proposed Code incorporate the commonlaw “common-design” rule, which imposes complicity liability for
all crimes in furtherance of a common criminal design or
agreement on all parties to the agreement, whether or not they
foresaw, knew about, or ratified those crimes?
Yes: The common-design rule makes it easier to convict an
offender’s confederates without a complex and difficult
evidentiary showing of culpability.
No: The common-design rule inappropriately allows for
liability based on negligence, or even in the absence of
culpability as to the offense. The original 1961 Code sought to
eliminate the common-design rule, which was then resurrected
in case law. To the extent such a complicity rule is considered

Ryan created the Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission, Chaired by
Matthew Bettenhausen, with special counsel Wayne R. LaFave and Andrew D.
Leipold, and with many varied and distinguished members. Id. Perhaps most
significantly, Paul H. Robinson served as the commission’s Reporter and put in
literally thousands of hours of work for the commission. Id. at iii–iv.
120
Id. at iv.
121
See id. at v.
122
Id. at lvi–lviii. Indeed, noting that “the Illinois courts have resurrected a
common law rule of accountability for which there is no statutory authority,” the
report went on to note a remarkable anomaly created by that rule: as “a person may
be found liable as an accomplice even where, based on his lack of culpability, he
would have no liability if he himself had personally committed the crime.” Id. at lvii.
Moreover, the very committee appointed to create the 1961 code stated that “liability
under this subsection requires proof on an ‘intent to promote or
facilitate . . . commission’ of the substantive offense.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52 cmt. (West 1993).
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necessary or desirable in the homicide context, it can be
addressed directly through a felony-murder rule.
Reporter: Strongly recommends against expanding liability
beyond the current complicity provision.123

In that final report, then, the commission strengthened the
section on complicity. Whereas the statute only spoke in terms of
someone intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the
offense,124 the commission report provided ultimate clarity
regarding the requisite mental state. Thus, proposed section 301
stated that one is accountable for the conduct of another if,
“having the culpability required by the offense, he intentionally
aids, solicits, or conspires with such other person in the planning
or commission of the offense . . . .”125 The mental state for the
offense had to be the same for the principal actor and accomplice
alike.
Unfortunately, the achievements of that commission were
short-lived. Shortly after the report was published, Governor
Ryan left the office in disgrace, which left no one to shepherd a
new code through the state legislature.126 What followed only
seems to confirm Professor Stuntz’s dour vision of the progress of
criminal law.
Another law reform commission emerged in 2005, seemingly
with the same ambition as the earlier one. The group, known as
the CLEAR Initiative, established an objective to rid the code of
its “redundancies, inconsistencies and confusing language” and to
generally improve a code that had become unwieldy over the
years, often producing unjust results.127 Chaired by former
Governor James Thompson, it shared only one member from the
prior commission, DuPage County Prosecutor Joseph E. Birkett,
a member who had dissented from some of the ambitions of the

123

FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 19, n.1.
The Model Penal Code, like the Illinois code, is slightly ambiguous about the
mental state for complicity, providing for intentional assistance, but not specifically
stating what the accompanying mental state must be.
125
FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 19 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
126
Governor Ryan was involved in a scandal dating back to his days as
Secretary of State. He was found guilty on twenty counts in a trial concluding on
April 17, 2006 and is currently in prison. Monica Davey & Gretchen Ruethling,
Former Illinois Governor Is Convicted in Graft Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/18/us/18ryan.html?_r=2&ref=georgeryan&.
127
CLEAR INITIATIVE, http://www.clearinitiative.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
An obvious acronym, CLEAR stands for Criminal Law Edit, Allignment and Reform.
124
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earlier commission.128 Touting its allegiance to the Principle of
Legality, it did little but codify the notion of common design,
placing it side-by-side with the obviously conflicting Model Penal
Code counterpart.129
Having discussed this failure elsewhere, there is no need to
revisit this sorry effort further.130 The natural and probable
consequences doctrine—here designated common design—simply
extends an already attenuated principle of liability beyond the
breaking point. But the very existence of this extreme doctrine
owes to the ambivalence surrounding accomplice liability
generally. Ill-conceived, it is nonetheless an understandable
outgrowth of a principle of liability closely tied to agency
principles, thus often dissociated from concepts of fault.
German law and the common law predicated liability on
party status. The Model Penal Code swept that aside, but that
simplification carried its own problems, throwing into question
the very basis for accomplice liability. Scholars, then, strive to
derive some grand theory of accomplice liability. But any grand
theory here must fail, and the very quest for one loses sight of
some fundamental objectives of the criminal law.

128

See Letter from Joseph E. Birkett to Paul H. Robinson (Oct. 24, 2000) (on file
with the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission Staff) (resisting
any major rewrite of the code).
129
See generally Heyman, supra note 8.
An essential feature of a criminal code is the Principle of Legality, which
requires that penal law should give notice to the citizenry as to what
conduct is proscribed as well as provide an ascertainable standard of guilt
to those who have enforcement responsibilities, such as police, prosecutors,
judges and juries.
John Decker, The Mission of the Criminal Law Edit, Alignment, and Reform
Commission (CLEAR): An Introductory Commentary, 41 J. MARSHALL L.REV. 611,
657–58 (2008) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). Professor Decker was the
Special Advisor to the CLEAR Initiative.
That this mirrors the sentiments of the prior commission is a sad irony, given the
clear departure of the latter group from this principle in its codification of common
design. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.
130
See Heyman, supra note 8, at 390–91. Indeed, CLEAR’s failure was not lost
on Robinson. When I contacted him about the codification of common design, he
seemed resigned, telling me that it came as no surprise, as “that is exactly what you
should expect from that crowd.” E-Mail from Paul H. Robinson to Michael G.
Heyman (May 6, 2010) (on file with author).
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III. COMPLICITY LAW: THE SETTING
Complicity law is troubling. Reading the tale our youthful
translator, we chafe at the idea of imposing liability for
potentially slight, impromptu assistance—worse, because of the
offense, he faced a mandatory ten-year sentence. Yet, we also
recognize that some criminal acts either require joint efforts or in
fact result from such contributions of one sort or another. There,
the very notions of principal and accomplice blur, and we begin to
see the merit of the German system, differentiating as it does
among a variety of types of actors. In that, it resists the binary
choice of our system of either guilty or not guilty with potentially
identical punishments. Unfortunately, the very emergence of the
notion of Tatherrschaft demonstrates the flaws of that scheme.
Moreover, that concept itself, as previously mentioned has been
further refined, thus underscoring its inadequacy as an allembracing theory.
The strength of any theory lies in its ability to successfully
address hard cases. The easy ones are readily handled. For
example, apparently the Code decided to address the Othello
situation by including the notion of “provoking” one to commit a
crime. That is, because of the slight inaccuracy of characterizing
Iago’s conduct through other terms, provocation seemed more
appropriate. However, those involved settled on “encourage,” as
it seemed adequately broad to cover a variety of acts.131 But that
is an easy case. The harder cases can involve multiple parties, a
variety of types of contributions, and varying degrees of
commitment to the criminal enterprise.
131
See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART I §§ 3.01 to 5.07, § 5.02 at
372 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985) (“Encouragement also covers
forms of communication designed to lead the recipient to act criminally, even if the
message is not as direct as a command or request. Whether one can ‘encourage’
without communicating a desire that a crime be committed may be more arguable,
but the term is probably broad enough to cover such cases as well if a criminal
purpose exists.”). Indeed, Professor Kadish discussed Othello on numerous
occasions, concluding, “there is no reason why Iago should not be held accountable as
Othello’s accessory.” Kadish, supra note 1, at 365. It should be noted that this is the
Commentary to section 5.02, dealing with solicitation to commit a crime. The Model
Penal Code explicitly uses the term “encourages,” the subject of this debate:
A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of
promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or
requests another person to engage in specific conduct that would constitute
such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or would establish his
complicity in its commission or attempted commission.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 (2011).
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Take newly minted parolee Danny Ocean, from the movie
Ocean’s Eleven, who sought revenge against the man who was
dating his ex-wife.132 Danny developed a plan to steal a hundredand-fifty-million dollars from the vault housing the monies from
the three casinos owned by his ex-wife’s boyfriend. He first hired
a blackjack dealer, Frank Catton, and then reunited with Rusty
Ryan, who became his right-hand man, helping him to devise the
scheme and recruit the appropriate personnel.
The personnel consisted of a wealthy financier, Reuben
Tishkoff, who, at first, reluctantly agreed to bankroll the venture;
an electronics expert, Livingston Dell; a demolitions man, Basher
Tarr; a savvy old-timer, Saul Bloom; the Malloy Brothers, the
pickpocket, Linus Caldwell; and, perhaps most important, a
“grease man” named Yen.133 In a wildly detailed plan, Danny
and Rusty set out, through brains and guile, to build an exact
replica of the vault, forward a video of that replica to security to
create a sense of well being, black out the city, and, through
other pyrotechnics, to pull off the heist.
Every member played an indispensible role, though only
three entered the vault itself: Danny, Linus and Yen. Every
member was aware of all details of the plan, though Danny
concealed his true motive of revenge from them. Also, though all
did something indispensible, the form of the contributions
differed greatly, as did the relationship of each to the gang and
one another. Naturally, their commitments to the venture
differed too, as they were in it for different reasons, though all
seemed to genuinely relish the challenge of the plan.

132
This account is taken from the synopsis at the IMDB website. Synopsis for
Ocean’s Eleven, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0240772/synopsis (last visited
Jun. 29, 2013).
133
Yen could be described as
a 95 pound ‘little Chinese guy’, who worked as an acrobat in a Las Vegas
show. He was so flexible that he could fold in half and fit in a very small
tube in a portable safe. At the time of the robbery this is how he got into
the vault of the casino. He got in, and therefore they called him the
greaseman.
Urban Dictionary: greaseman, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/
define.php?term=greaseman (last visited Jun. 29, 2013).
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Dominant Justifications for Accomplice Liability

Though a comparatively neglected topic, discussions of
accomplice liability have clustered about two central concepts:
act dominion and causation. In a major piece, Professor Kadish
tried to explain why causation should play no role at all.
Eschewing the analogy to a mechanical system, Kadish explained
the difference between human actions and non-willed events: “In
a word, every volitional actor is a wild card; he need never act in
a certain way. . . . Since an individual could always have chosen
to act without the influence, it is always possible that he might
have. No laws of nature can settle the issue.”134 Thus, though
Kadish embraced the notion that people “influence” others,135 he
saw the criminal actor as a free moral agent, one who bore sole
causal responsibility for her choices.
But is that right? Kadish focused on the decision to commit
the crime, seeing no other role for causation in that universe of
conduct. But don’t the contributions of others play different and
substantial roles, culminating in the criminal conduct itself?
German theorists, refining the notion of Tatherrschaft,
recognized that it naturally subdivided into several categories,
among which was Willensherrschaft, control over the volitional
controls of another. By narrowly focusing on only this aspect of
causation, Kadish lost sight of the variety of ways people
contribute to ultimate outcomes.136
In Ocean’s Eleven, Danny went to see Reuben for money to
bankroll the criminal venture. Indeed, because of the complexity
of the scheme, the cost was undoubtedly enormous. But without
that backing, the job could never have been pulled. Reuben had
absolutely no control over the plans and only contributed the
financial wherewithal for the crime. By Kadish’s thinking, he
played no role in causing that conduct. Of course he did. That
money was indispensible to the crime and played a role, along
with a host of other factors. in bringing it about.
Because of that backing, Danny could attract the personnel
he did and bring his grand scheme to fruition. Indeed, that
backing provided comfort and supplies to the gang that led
directly to their criminal success. Reacting against Kadish’s

134
135
136

Kadish, supra note 1, at 360.
Id. at 343.
See supra text accompanying note 58.
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narrow view, Dressler tried to revamp the theoretical
underpinnings for complicity.137 Tracking some of our intuitions,
his approach seeks to mete out punishment proportionally to the
harm people cause.138 This operates in two ways. Since he who
causes the harm has created social harm, he should receive
substantial punishment. However, the accomplice who lends
non-causal assistance should, then, receive less punishment as,
though the involvement is there, the harm is not. Taking this a
step further, Dressler even provided sample statutes that
captured this distinction.139
But this is too neat a distinction. Every member of Ocean’s
Eleven helped produce the result, though not in the sense of
human agency advanced by Kadish.140 All parties were entirely
interdependent, thus bringing about the final result. They
caused it as surely as did Danny and Linus, by rappelling into
the vault, as did Yen, by folding himself in half to occupy a tiny
space, as did the technical accomplices and, of course, the
redoubtable Reuben and Saul. In fact, had Danny not been at
the crime site, there is still no doubt that we would regard him as
the dominant figure in this gang, though he would then be acting
only in an accomplice capacity.
We would regard him as the overwhelmingly dominant
figure because he interacted with everyone, conceived the plan,
assembled the personnel, and was most deeply committed to its
success at every point. This sort of group dynamic has not gone
unnoticed, as Dressler has retreated somewhat from his
causation approach in recent years. Most recently, he tried to
balance these two dominant themes of act hegemony and
causation. Thus, he proposes that “[a] person is not accountable
for the actions of the perpetrator unless her assistance not only
137

See Dressler, supra note 32, at 92–93 n.2.
Id. at 130.
139
First, he provided: “A person is guilty of any offense specified in this Code if,
acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense,
he causes the harm specified by the offense to be committed by another.” Then,
dealing with the non-causal accomplice: “A person is guilty of the offense of
Noncausal Assistance if, acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
commission of another offense: . . . he purposely assists, or influences another, in the
commission of other [sic] offense . . . . ” Id. at 138.
140
That is, though it is not clear how the mere accomplices convinced the
principals to commit the criminal act of stealing from the vault. But the question
seems trivial, as the assembled group was completely interdependent, success
depending on the successful operation of the various role players.
138
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satisfies the causation requirement but there is evidence that the
accomplice was a substantial participant, not a bit player, in the
multi-party crime.”141 But that verges on tautology, as it
provides no standard for finding causal contribution or major
party status. Virtually conceding this, he further elaborated that
the “best reform” may consist of drawing distinctions on the basis
of “the substantiality of the actor’s participation.”142 By that
view, the minor participant should only be guilty of a lesser
crime, whatever that might be.143
Sometimes there are lesser crimes. In some areas, specific
substantive laws have been passed that address the liability of
those in foreseeable chains of criminal wrongdoing. Thus, for
example, laws prohibiting the sale of handguns to minors aim to
punish those who facilitate offenses by young, impulsive
wrongdoers.144 Unfortunately, since the range of assistance is
almost unimaginably varied, this simply cannot work on any
meaningful scale, as that would require an impossibly complex
reconceptualization of all crimes. How would we treat the
various members of Danny’s group? How could those types of
contributions possibly be identified and categorized? And that
approach would also be in tension with our fundamental
intuitions that some forms of aid are so major, their effects so
profound, that the actors simply must receive substantial
punishment, though technically they are only accomplices. The
punishment should fit the crime, and the crime is the one
assisted.
New York departs from the view that accomplice liability
should be structured to fit the crime, at least in part. Instead,
codifying the notion of criminal facilitator, it somewhat
uncouples liability from the target offense, thus creating four
levels of facilitators.145 Resembling the German approach, it
predicates liability on the age of the perpetrator, the age of the

141

Dressler, supra note 14, at 447.
Id. at 448.
143
Id.
144
See Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217,
270–271 (2000). In fact, Weisberg points out this alternative to reformulating
notions of the bases for accomplice liability. Id.
145
These provisions are in addition to New York complicity law, which takes
rather traditional form.
142
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facilitator, and the gravity of the target offense.146 Thus, for
example, the most serious crime is facilitation in the first degree,
defined as:
[a] person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the first degree
when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person
under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct
that would constitute a class A felony, he, being over eighteen
years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person
with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and
which in fact aids such person to commit such a class A
felony.147

Having the clear virtue of expanding that binary universe of
accomplice-like liability, it avoids the trying metaphysics of some
theories, instead basing liability on the youth of the perpetrator
and the efficacy of the assistance provided. But that may
exhaust its virtues. Focusing on the conduct feature, it limits
liability to those things that provide “means or opportunity”
only.148 How, or whether, that could address some of the
characters in Ocean’s Eleven, our young translator, or jazz
aficionado of the Hawkins case is unclear. Thus, its relationship
to New York’s general complicity law becomes unclear as well.149
New York’s culpability features are even stranger. Hinging
liability on the actor’s belief that she is probably rendering
assistance to another, it specifies neither knowledge nor
recklessness, thus leaving culpability unacceptably vague.
Moreover, the facilitator need not have the mental state for the
commission of the target offense, thus further distancing him
from this event.150 So, it would seem that the assistance itself is
the gravamen of the offense. Unfortunately, the commentary on
that section suggests otherwise: “In fact, the conduct of the
facilitator will be generally ‘confined to preparation so attenuated
146

See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.08 (McKinney 2012).
Id. Criminal facilitation in the first degree is a Class B felony, one step down
from the assisted crime.
148
Id.
149
New York’s general complicity law states: “When one person engages in
conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such
conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission
thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such
person to engage in such conduct.” Id. § 20.00.
150
The scheme provides no defense even if “[t]he defendant himself is not guilty
of the felony which he facilitated because he did not act with the intent or other
culpable mental state required for the commission thereof.” Id. § 115.10.
147
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from the final stages that the role of the facilitator is only
remotely related as a cause or contributor to the ultimate
crime.’ ”151
Accordingly, this approach fails, at least as
implemented, as an alternative or addition to general complicity
law.152
The failure of these alternatives does not reveal the
intractability of the problem, but may, on closer examination,
signal the presence of a pseudo-problem.
Ocean’s Eleven
demonstrates the remarkable breadth of assistance possible in a
multi-party venture.153 Causation, depth of commitment, and act
dominion provide fine abstractions, but break down as ineffective
tools for carefully calibrating blame and punishment. They
simply cannot work with optimal precision. But does the Code’s
approach, sweeping though it is, really fail to provide an
adequate legal standard for accomplice liability?
IV. JUST DESERTS AND THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PUNISHING
ACCOMPLICES
The failures of the New York approach, of specific assistance
statutes, and of any grand theory are of a piece: Each attempts
to deal with the infinite variability of human conduct by reducing
it to some common features and apportioning blame accordingly.
Each envisions some rule that captures this infinite variety of
conduct, reducing that to manageable categories. The Code takes
a different approach, as its operative conduct consists of “aid” or
“agreement” to aid in the planning or commission of the offense.
Rejecting some rule or set of rules, the Code instead opted for a
broad standard for determining accountability.
Effectively
rejecting the objective of somehow finding a perfect rule of
complicity, it recognizes the real-world limitations of that ideal.

151
William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00, at 106
(quoting People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 495, 501, 298 N.E. 2d
647, 651, (1973)). The model jury instructions for this section provide little guidance,
as they only require the jury to find that the facilitator “was rendering aid” and that
the conduct “in fact aided” the principal actor. CJI2d[N.Y.] PL 115,
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/2-PenalLaw/115/115-08.pdf.
152
Robert Weisberg reached a similar conclusion, recognizing that because of
internal definitional issues and “ill-coordination with complicity laws more
generally, they cannot avoid the perennial problems of complicity law.” Weisberg,
supra note 144, at 270.
153
Indeed, not to court the precious, but the last installment in this area was
Ocean’s Thirteen in 2007, thus adding to the complexity.
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The Code’s beauty lies in the very generality of its language.
Essentially embodying a standard for accomplice liability, it
avoids the pitfalls of yielding to any constricting rules, which
distinguishes it from less successful efforts.154
Moreover, the Code’s scrupulous adherence to culpability
principles assuages fears of potential injustice and uncertainty.
To be an accomplice, one must intentionally aid another in the
commission of the offense.155 Beyond that, one must do so with
the mens rea for the target offense. These requirements achieve
two critical objectives: They help determine the commitment of
the actor to the venture and prevent the conviction of the
indifferent companion.
Perhaps the young translator was, indeed, that indifferent
companion. As Kadish demonstrated, under the Code approach
he should not be convicted absent a showing of conduct on his
part intended to further the drug offense.156 Likewise, the
attendee at the jazz concert in London should not have been
convicted as an accomplice to Hawkins because he did not assist
him in committing the immigration violation and the prosecution
has the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Fortunately, though, Danny’s full complement of helpers
would be convicted, as, by hypothesis, they all knew of the plan,
its objective, and their interdependence in the commission of the
theft—and pursued it with uncommon dedication. And yet, we
recoil somewhat at the notion of lumping them together,
particularly because their roles differed so substantially. Danny
was the obvious kingpin, but some, like Yen, were, in Dressler’s
language, bit players.

154
Professor Pierre Schlag cleverly avoided buying into any static notion of
these concepts. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV.
379 (1985). Schlag recounts a pithy distinction between the two, involving the
obligations of drivers at railroad crossings. Whereas Holmes offered the rule that the
driver must stop, look and listen, Cardozo instead suggested that the actor proceed
with reasonable caution. Id. Though too much can be made of the differences
between these legal tools, standards seem to afford a flexibility not readily shared
with rules. Conversely, rules seem to provide a certainty fitting for criminal law.
155
Recognizing the breadth of the notions of assistance and influence, Kadish
pointed out that they could encompass meanings such as: advise, persuade,
command, encourage, induce, procure, instigate, or solicit. Kadish, supra note 1, at
343.
156
See id.

FINAL_HEYMAN

166

12/11/2013 3:33 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:129

We recoil for the wrong reasons. Our discomfort results from
thinking in causal terms, and for instinctively predicating guilt
on causal contribution to the result. Perhaps results do not
matter.
A.

Lessons from the Field: Insights from Social Psychology and
Penology

In the summer of 1971, Philip Zimbardo launched a program
known as the Stanford Prison Experiment.157 Working with
students in his summer course on the psychology of
imprisonment, he established a simulated prison setting at
Stanford, including guards and prisoners who were students in
the course.158 The results were stunning and horrifying. Within
six days, he terminated the project “because it was running out of
control.”159 Reminiscent of Lord of the Flies, the guards were
abusing the prisoners so badly that the psychological damage
was staggering.
From this and similar situations, Zimbardo learned of the
“pervasive yet subtle power of a host of situational variables
[that] dominate an individual’s will to resist.”160 Good people can
engage in evil conduct as a result of the forces of
“deindividuation, obedience to authority, passivity in the face of
threats, self-justification, and rationalization.”161 According to
Zimbardo, this convincing explains the atrocities at Abu Ghraib
as well as other shameful uses of power over others.162
But explanation is not to be confused with excuse. Though
discussing this banality of evil, Zimbardo did not excuse such
actions, but rather, praised those who resisted these pernicious
forces.163 Similarly, those who commit crimes with others are not
to be forgiven despite these powerful social forces that influence
157
PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL 1920 (2007).
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See id.
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Philip G. Zimbardo, Revisiting the Stanford Prison Experiment: A Lesson in
the Power of Situation, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 30, 2007, at B6.
Zimbardo reported that “[b]y [d]ay 5, five of the student prisoners [had] to be
released early because of extreme stress.” Id. In the same vein, most of the
remaining students “[adopted] a zombielike attitude and posture, totally obedient to
escalating guard demands.” Id.
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ZIMBARDO, supra note 157, at xii.
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Id.
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See id.
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Inverting things, he also spoke of the “banality of heroism.” Id. at 21.
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behavior. Indeed, those selfsame forces create an environment
conducive to criminality and violence, and those who participate
freely have chosen that environment as theirs. Having created
that environment, they have thus increased the likelihood of
crime and must accept punishment accordingly.
Those who seek the perfect test for complicity may have lost
sight of just what they are seeking. Likewise, this Article noted
the extraordinary use of interpretation and the power
represented by criminal law.164 Punishing serious violations of
our norms, criminal law determines whether and to what extent
certain people should be punished.
The Code emphasizes
culpability as the touchstone, as do many current thinkers.
This approach recognizes risk creation as the basis for the
criminal sanction. It considers “an actor deserving of punishment
when he violates these norms that forbid the unjustified harming
of, or risking harm to, others—that is, failing to give others’
interests their proper weight.”165 That is why we punish:
Inherent in that choice to do something wrong is the choice to
devalue others as well as the norms that should bind.
Conversely, just as some should receive the punishments they
deserve, they should receive no more than that, or none at all, if
they have not made such choices.166 This focus explains the
appropriate antipathy toward laws that penalize the indifferent
actor, the person only tenuously connected to the wrongdoing.167

164

Id. at 6.
LARRY ALEXANDER, ET AL., CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL
LAW 6 (2009). Stephen Morse, also a psychologist, recognized that “[i]t is simply a
fact about human beings that potential encouragement or aid in principle increases
the risk that the recipient will commit the act aided or encouraged.” Stephen J.
Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 398 (2004).
As he said, this is simply “how the world works.” Id.
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As Alexander said, “unperceived risks do not affect the actor’s culpability.”
ALEXANDER, ET AL., supra note 165, at 18. An argument against negligence, it is, a
fortiori, one against liability without any risk creation at all.
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Some commentators have tried to make sense of various theories of
inculpation without culpability. For example, Paul Robinson wrote a piece in which
he isolated four such theories across a wide range of crimes, accepting some, while
rejecting others. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93
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This unswerving focus on culpability solves many problems.
It justifies the conviction of Ocean’s Eleven, while questioning
that of others discussed here. It supports the Code’s general
theory of complicity, meting out punishment proportionally with
what people have wrongly done, thus utterly rejecting vicarious
liability.168 And it argues powerfully against views such as the
natural and probable doctrine.
For all the formal objections to natural and probable, the
most troubling is its rejection of this bedrock concept of personal
responsibility.169
Rudy Kessler did nothing to warrant a
conviction of attempted murder. Similarly, though Marcus
Cooper “attached himself” to a violent gang, there was no
showing whatsoever that he committed aggravated battery with
a firearm.170 Imposition of liability under this doctrine is wholly
unjustified and affirms Professor Stuntz’s baleful vision of
criminal justice in America. In an area itself fraught with
problems, this doctrine is simply barbaric.
CONCLUSION
Dressler proclaimed, “American accomplice law is a
disgrace.”171 Noting the binary nature of guilt and innocence,
surely he has a point. Portraying injustices such as that of the
young translator, he further established his position. And
certainly, he rightly criticized the natural and probable view for
many of the same reasons expressed here. But beyond that, it is
just not that simple.
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As Professor Morse noted, this “account of accomplice liability focuses
entirely on the accomplice’s own behavior and suggests that accomplice liability
should not be derivative.” Morse, supra note 165. However, even though Professor
Morse is correct that guilt is personal, liability is derivative in the sense that the
accomplice assumes responsibility for the actus reus of the crime through his own
culpable participation.
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By “formal,” I mean such matters as the statutory factors that bar its
imposition, its inconsistency with the Code view in states such as Illinois that have
enacted both, and its obvious subversion of the presumption of innocence and the
need for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Strikingly, the California version
of this rule assigns responsibility to those who are “concerned in the commission of a
crime.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 2012). Thus, for example, some defendants who
had robbed a business were found guilty of subsequent rapes committed, because of
the “sexual aura” of the business robbed. People v. Nguyen, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 332
(Ct. App. 1993).
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Illinois adopted its code over fifty years ago, yet courts
simply refused to apply it properly. They ignored it despite
unambiguous state code commentary, as well as clear language
from that of the Model Penal Code. Sadly, this has not been
simply a local phenomenon, but rather, has occurred countless
times throughout the country following the Code revolution of the
1960s and 1970s. Hardly a pattern restricted to complicity law,
blatant disregard for the proper administration of the Code may
nevertheless be most malign here.
Worse, the forces that shape criminal law cut against the
grain of sound law reform. Attacks on the rule of law validate
Bill Stuntz’s vision of criminal law as an area driven by special
interests, with no counterbalancing forces at work.172 The results
truly are pathological, even resulting in codifications that restore
the inanity of the pre-Code era.
But academic efforts to rethink complicity law show little
promise. There is no need for new statutory law; rather, we must
recognize the stunning accomplishment of the Code and further
recognize its sound theoretical underpinnings. Focusing on risk
creation, it promotes punishing those who intentionally pursue
these criminal objectives. Thus, deflecting the focus to also
capture notions such as causal contribution, it distorts that very
focus.
The natural and probable view is manifestly unjust, but it is
simply the most extreme example of law losing touch with its
fundamental objectives. All aspects of complicity law that are
similarly adrift should be rejected. But that requires the will—
perhaps the political will—of those involved to repudiate this
legal monster that complicity law has become.
Courts, prosecutors, and legislators have to sincerely pursue
the rule of law and stop paying it mere lip service. No magic
wand can make this happen, nor can any grand theory improve
upon what we already have. Rather, the people involved in the
criminal justice system must stop pursuing what can only be a
form of blood lust and return to an ideologically neutral law or
risk losing all sense of just proportion.
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Reviewing Stuntz’s last book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice,
Tracey Meares made a poignant observation: “[I]t is justice that has collapsed, not
the system that purportedly delivers it.” Tracey L. Meares, Justice Falls Down:
America’s Flawed Criminal Justice System, HARV. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 18, 18.

